The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus was initially isolated in 1996 in China (Xu et al., 1999) and caused much concern in 1997, with 18 recorded human infections and six deaths in Hong Kong (Chan, 2002) . Reemergence of the H5N1 virus was reported in 2003. Since then, transmission of H5N1 viruses from avian hosts to humans has been reported in 17 countries and areas worldwide, leading to 676 laboratory-confirmed infections and 398 deaths as of 4 December 2014 (WHO, 2014a) . Importantly, the H5N1 virus can infect migratory birds, which act as vectors that contribute to the spread of the virus to new areas via long-distance migration and transmission to domestic poultry through direct or indirect contact (Liu et al., 2005; Sakoda et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2008) . Since its emergence, the HPAI H5N1 virus has been proposed as a likely candidate for a potential influenza pandemic, although effective human-to-human transmission is yet to be demonstrated. To date, the H5N1 virus has become endemic in domestic birds in China, Southeast Asia and Africa, and evolved into numerous phylogenetic lineages (WHO/OIE/FAO, 2012) . Amongst the 32 distinguishable clades of H5N1, clades 2.3.2.1, 2.3.4.2 and 7.2 are predominant in China (WHO/OIE/FAO, 2012) . Additionally, evolutionary clades, such as 2.3.4.5 and 2.3.4.6, have been reported (Gu et al., 2013) . In addition to haemagglutinin (HA) evolution, internal genes of the IP: 54.70.40.11
On: Thu, 03 Jan 2019 00:32:52 H5N1 virus have frequently reassorted with other subtypes of avian influenza viruses circulating in poultry (Neumann et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2008) . In particular, H5N5, H5N8 and H5N2 subtypes bearing the genetic backbone of clade 2.3.4 H5N1 viruses have been identified in poultry populations (Gu et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2014) .
Apart from the H5N1 subtype, various reassortants of the H5 subtype with other neuraminidase (NA) subtypes have been isolated, although none of them has been documented to cause human infection. However, on 6 May 2014, a fatal H5N6 human infection was reported in Sichuan Province, China (China CDC, 2014; WHO, 2014b) . The patient was a poultry dealer working directly in live poultry markets (LPMs), recently shown to play a key role in human infection with influenza A (H7N9 and H10N8) viruses (Cowling et al., 2013; Gao, 2014; Zhang et al., 2014) . However, the origin of the novel H5N6 virus remains unknown. To determine the evolutionary history of H5N6 in China, we performed comprehensive genetic analysis of the full-length genome sequences of eight H5N6 and three H5N1 viruses isolated from LPMs.
Surveillance in five LPMs was conducted on 26 and 27 April 2014 in Nanbu County, Sichuan Province, where human infection with the H5N6 virus was reported (Fig.  S1 , available in the online Supplementary Material). A total of 77 oropharyngeal and cloacal mixed swab samples (one oropharyngeal and cloacal mixed swab for one bird) were collected from chickens (n510), ducks (n531) and pigeons (n536), along with 19 faeces and nine poultry drinking-water samples. The surveillance additionally covered the Dunzitang LPM of Nanchang city (Jiangxi Province) where human infection with the H10N8 virus was recorded on 30 November 2013 (Chen et al., 2014) . Overall, 18 oropharyngeal and 18 cloacal swab samples (one oropharynx and one cloacal swab for one bird) were collected from chickens. Samples were kept in viral medium at 4 u C until transported to the laboratory and then either stored at 280 u C or directly inoculated in 10-day-old specific pathogen-free embryonated chicken eggs for 72 h at 37 u C. Complete gene segments of the HA titrepositive samples were amplified using the improved primers (Table S1 ) designed based on previous reports (Hoffmann et al., 2001; Li et al., 2007) and sequenced using an ABI 3730XL automatic DNA analyser. In total, 16 samples were H5-positive; nine H5 viruses were isolated from the oropharyngeal and cloacal mixed swabs in Sichuan Province, including six influenza A (H5N6) viruses (SC-H5N6) and three influenza A (H5N1) viruses (SC-H5N1); two influenza A (H5N6) viruses were isolated from the oropharyngeal swabs in Jiangxi Province (JX-H5N6). The other five H5-positive samples were detected to be mixed with other subtypes, such as H6, H7 and H9 viruses, in Sichuan Province and Jiangxi Province. We determined the full-length genome sequences of these strains of the 11 avian influenza viruses isolated from both Sichuan Province and Jiangxi Province (H5N6, n58; H5N1, n53; Table 1 ). Genome sequences of the other five recently identified avian and human influenza A (H5N6) viruses from China were retrieved from the Influenza Virus Resources at GenBank and the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Database (GISAID) ( Table 1 ). The 16 fulllength avian influenza virus genomes were divided into eight datasets corresponding to the eight independent RNA segments of type A influenza virus. For the NA dataset, the three NA sequences of the H5N1 subtype (SC-H5N1) were removed. The eight datasets were subsequently used as queries to perform a BLAST search against GenBank to obtain reference sequences. BLAST hits and their corresponding query datasets were combined and aligned using Clustal Omega.
Sequence comparison disclosed high nucleotide identity amongst HA genes of the SC-H5N6 isolates (.99.3 %) and between the two JX-H5N6 isolates (99.8 %). HA genes of the SC-H5N6 isolates shared 95.1-95.6 % sequence similarity with JX-H5N6 isolates. In addition, the HA gene of the reference strain, A/environment/Zhenjiang/C13/ 2013 (H5N6) (EN/ZJ/C13/13), displayed higher identity with SC-H5N6 ( (Table S2 ).
High nucleotide identity was observed amongst NA genes of the SC-H5N6 isolates (99.6-99.9 %) and between the two JX-H5N6 isolates (99.7 %). However, NA genes of the SC-H5N6 and JX-H5N6 isolates shared only 89.3-89.6 % sequence identity. Interestingly, NA genes of SC-H5N6 isolates showed higher identity with EN/ZJ/C13/13 (H5N6) (99.0-99.2 %) than DK/GD/GD01/14 (H5N6), EN/SZ/25-24/13 (H5N6) and DK/JX/95/14 (H5N6) (89.7-90.0 %) (Table S2) .
A BLAST search showed that the internal genes of H5N6 viruses from China were similar to the H5N1 viruses circulating in China and Southeast Asia. Specifically, genes of the SC-H5N6 isolates possessed 99.6-100 % nucleotide identity, whilst nucleotide identities of the JX-H5N6 isolates ranged from 99.2 to 99.9 %. In addition, internal genes of the SC-H5N6 isolates displayed 96. 7-98.7, 97.9-98.8, 96.0-99.7 and 96.4-98 .7 % identity with JX-H5N6, SC-H5N1, EN/ZJ/C13/13 (H5N6) and the other three H5N6 [DK/GD/GD01/14 (H5N6), EN/SZ/25-24/13 (H5N6) and DK/JX/95/14 (H5N6)] viruses, respectively, whilst JX-H5N6 isolates showed 97. 8-99.2, 93.8-98.4 and 96.6-99 .7 % identity with SC-H5N1, EN/ZJ/C13/13 (H5N6) and the other three H5N6 viruses (Table S2) (Table S2) .
Phylogenetic analysis was performed using the maximumlikelihood method in RAxML. The GTRGAMMA model was applied and 1000 bootstrap replicates performed. It should be noted that for the HA dataset, the most related reference sequences were selected and combined with a dataset comprising sequences of representative HA clades. Phylogenetic trees were visualized using Dendroscope software.
From the HA phylogeny (Fig. 1a) , genes of the recently identified Chinese H5N6 avian influenza viruses and the human-source virus fell within clade 2.3.4, suggesting that they were originally derived from the HPAI H5N1 viruses circulating in China. Phylogenetic trees reconstructed using the six internal gene sequences consistently showed that all identified H5N6 and H5N1 avian influenza viruses stemmed from previously circulating H5N1 lineages in China and Southeast Asia (Fig. S2 ). In contrast, the NA phylogenetic tree revealed that the NA genes originated from H6N6 avian influenza virus circulating in the Fujian and Guangdong Provinces of China (Fig. 1b) .
Notably, in all eight gene phylogenetic trees, Chinese H5N6 avian influenza viruses formed two independent lineages (Figs 1 and S2 HA proteins of all H5N6 and H5N1 viruses possessed multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site (Table 1) , indicating high pathogenicity to poultry. Residues at the cleavage site of SC-H5N1 isolates were identified as RERRRKR/GL, whilst the H5N6 isolates contained two motifs, REKRRKR/GL and RERRRKR/GL. The HA protein of these isolates displayed Q226 and G228 (H3 numbering) at the receptor binding site, suggesting that they favour avian-like receptors. The HA proteins of the SC-H5N1 isolates contained T160 (Table 1) , whereas a T160A substitution was observed in HA of all H5N6 viruses, which is proposed to enhance binding capacity to humanlike receptors (Gao et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2013) .
The NA stalk of SC-H5N1 viruses had a 20 aa deletion (positions 49-68), which might enhance virus adaptation to domestic fowl and increase virulence in mammals (Cauldwell et al., 2014; Matsuoka et al., 2009; Zhou et al., 2009) . This 20 aa deletion was not found in the NA stalk of SC-H5N6 and the human-H5N6 strain. Interestingly, however, JX-H5N6 isolates displayed an 11 aa deletion at positions 58-68. These findings suggested that the SC-H5N6 and JX-H5N6 isolates might have different adaptation and virulence characteristics in poultry and mammals.
Amino acids Q591, E627 and D701 were identified in the PB2 proteins of the H5N6 and H5N1 avian influenza viruses, indicating low adaptation to mammalian hosts. However, the human H5N6 virus contained a D701N mutation, which might enhance virulence for humans. Moreover, these H5N6 and H5N1 viruses contained a truncated PB1-F2 protein of 57 aa in length, which might influence their virulence in mammals (Zamarin et al., 2006; McAuley et al., 2010) . No drug resistance-associated mutations (H274Y in NA and S31N in M2 protein) were observed, signifying that these H5 isolates are sensitive to NA and M2 inhibitors.
To further identify the antigenicity of the H5N6 and H5N1 isolates, the HA inhibition (HI) assay with the reference H5 subtype antigens and antisera was performed according to standard protocols (WHO, 2011) . (Table 2 ). These findings indicated that all 11 H5 isolates described in this study could be novel clade 2.3.4 variants and have probably evolved to form a new subcluster, in accordance with the phylogenetic analysis (Figs 1a and S2a).
In 2014, H5N6 virus outbreaks in Laos (starting 13 March 2014), Vietnam (starting 13 April 2014) and China (starting 23 April 2014) resulted in the death and culling of .97 000 fowl (OIE, 2014; Wong et al., 2015) . In the present study, the two Jiangxi H5N6 viruses were isolated from dead chickens and the others were from apparently healthy birds. These findings suggested that the available H5N1 vaccines could not thoroughly eliminate the virus and may not completely protect poultry against H5N6 virus infection. Therefore, the infected poultry look apparently healthy; however, they can expel viruses to the surroundings. Fortunately, the H5N6 epidemic in Harbin (China) has been controlled and new vaccines will soon be deployed.
In summary, genetic and phylogenetic analyses indicate that two lineages of H5N6 viruses are currently circulating in five regions of China, designated Jiangxi and Sichuan.
Both lineages may have originated from reassortment events between the prevalent H5N1 and H6N6 viruses circulating in Southeast China. Phylogenetic and antigenic analyses suggest these H5N6 viruses belong to clade 2.3.4, and might have evolved into new subclades with altered antigenicity, as there were low reactions between the H5N6 isolates and the antisera of the vaccine strains. Notably, the novel H5N6 viruses were isolated from LPMs close to the site where the human H5N6 infection occurred, and there was a very close genetic relationship between the human and avian H5N6 viruses, supporting that human infection is caused through direct contact with poultry. Furthermore, these H5N6 viruses have distinct evolutionary characteristics, such as the A160 mutation in the HA protein and an 11 aa deletion in the NA stalk, which may enhance their adaptation and infectivity in mammals, including humans. Our collective findings highlight the necessity to maintain and expand avian influenza virus surveillance in LPMs for the prevention and control of human infection. data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript. We also thank the data submitters for their H5N6 sequences in the GISAID and GenBank databases.
